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AbstractRecently, a new image scrambling (i.e., encryp-
tion) scheme without bandwidth expansion was proposed based
on two-dimensional (2-D) discrete prolate spheroidal sequences
(DPSS). A comprehensive cryptanalysis is given here on this im-
age scrambling scheme, showing that it is not sufciently secure
against various cryptographical attacks including ciphertext-
only attack, known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext
attack. Detailed cryptanalytic results suggest that the image
scrambling scheme can only be used to realize perceptual
encryption, but not to provide content protection for digital
images.
Index Termsdiscrete prolate spheroidal sequence (DPSS),
image scrambling, encryption, cryptanalysis, ciphertext-only at-
tack, known-plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, chosen-
ciphertext attack, Hadamard matrix, perceptual encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Content protection of multimedia data (especially digital
images and videos) through encryption has attracted more
and more attention due to the rapid development of multi-
media and network technologies in past two decades. Various
image/video encryption (or scrambling1) schemes have been
proposed, but some of which have been cryptanalyzed to be
insecure. To offer some reasonable background knowledge
on the content of this paper, in the following a very brief
introduction to some existing image/video encryption schemes
will be given. For a more comprehensive survey of the state-
of-the-art of this topic, readers are referred to [1][6].
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1The term scrambling was used instead of encryption by some design-
ers of multimedia encryption schemes, especially by those early designers
who intended to encrypt analog signals by scrambling them in some way.
From a cryptographical point of view, we simply consider scrambling as a
synonym of encryption.
The most straightforward idea in image/video encryption is
to consider the entire 2-D multimedia data as a 1-D textual bit-
stream and then apply any conventional cipher that has been
validated in modern cryptography, such as DES, IDEA [7], and
AES [8]. This solution is sometime called naive encryption [9].
The major problem of naive encryption lies in the following
two aspects: 1) the encryption speed may be too slow; 2)
it does not consider the information redundancy existing in
the uncompressed images/videos and the syntax structures
of the compressed ones. A possible way to overcome these
problems is to encrypt part of the given plain-image/video,
which is called selective (or partial) encryption. For example,
for MPEG videos, only sign bits of the DCT coefcients and
the motion vectors can be selected for encryption. Even though
partial encryption may not provide a high level of security,
it is still useful for realizing perceptual encryption [2], [10]
and format-compliant encryption [11], two interesting security
requirements of some multimedia applications.
As a frequently-used approach to encrypting images and
videos, some schemes were designed by secretly permuting
pixels in the plain-image or each frame of the plain-video
[12][14]. This idea can also be generalized to the transform
domain, while in this case encryption is achieved by permuting
transform coefcients (and/or nodes for some transforms with
a tree-like structure)2 [17][20]. However, a large number
of cryptanalysis reports have shown that these permutation-
based image/video encryption schemes are not sufciently
secure from a cryptographical point of view [9], [21][27].
The main security problems include: 1) the plain-image/video
may be partially recovered due to the large information re-
dundancy existing in natural images/videos (under ciphertext-
only attack); 2) secret permutations are always insecure against
known/chosen-plaintext attack. As a general result of crypt-
analysis, secret permutations must be combined with other
techniques in order to design a secure image/video encryption
scheme.
Another idea in designing image/video encryption schemes
is to scramble all the pixels and/or transform coefcients
with some multiplicative or additive matrices. This idea can
be considered as a generalization of the permutation-only
encryption, since secret permutations can be formulated with
a permutation matrix as shown in the theoretical models
of some permutation-based speech scrambling schemes [15],
[16]. Many optical image encryption methods have been devel-
oped in this way, by introducing double random phase matrices
2Although speech encryption is not the focus of this paper, it is worth
mentioning that many speech scrambling schemes were also developed based
on this idea working in the transform domain [15], [16].
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(keys) [6], [28], [29], which are used to scramble the plain-
image in spatial and frequency (Fourier transform) domains,
respectively. However, some recent cryptanalysis work [30]
[32] shows that optical image encryption schemes of this kind
is not sufciently secure against known-plaintext attack and
chosen-ciphertext attack.
On the other hand, a large number of image encryption
schemes were designed by combining different encryption
techniques. For example, some image encryption schemes are
developed based on the multi-round combination of secret
permutations and pixel-value substitutions [33][35]. There
are also a number of attempts of using chaos to design
image/video encryption schemes [2], yet some of which have
been cryptanalyzed to be insecure [36][42].
This paper focuses on a new image scrambling scheme
proposed in [43], which is a 2-D extension of a speech
scrambling scheme proposed earlier in [44]. Compared with
other existing image scrambling methods, this scheme does not
introduce many high-frequency components into the spectrum
of the ciphertext, but causes only a negligible expansion of
bandwidth. This feature is useful in some real applications,
as the cipher-image can be transmitted with a band-limited
channel that carries the plain-image. The encryption process is
mainly achieved by scrambling low-frequency components of
a 2-D DPSS (discrete prolate spheroidal sequences) transform
by a multiplicative matrix, which serves as the secret key of
the scheme. To further enhance the security, random swapping
of some high-frequency components and multiple secret ma-
trices were also suggested, each of which corresponds to the
encryption of one single block of the plain-image.
In this paper, we report a thorough investigation on the
security of the image scrambling scheme proposed in [43],
and point out that it is not sufciently secure against vari-
ous cryptographical attacks including ciphertext-only attack,
known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack.
We also found some other security defects of the scheme when
a xed secret matrix is used to encrypt all blocks of the plain-
image. Based on the cryptanalytic results, we conclude that
the image scrambling scheme should only be used to realize
perceptual encryption, i.e., for degrading the visual quality of
the plain-images in a secret manner.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, a
description of the image scrambling scheme is given in the
next section. Then, Section III focuses on the cryptanalytic
ndings, with both theoretical and experimental results demon-
strated. In Sec. IV, the question of how to use the image
scrambling scheme in practice is addressed. Finally, the last
section concludes the paper.
II. THE IMAGE SCRAMBLING SCHEME WITHOUT
BANDWIDTH EXPANSION
The image scrambling scheme proposed in [43] is a 2-D
extension of Wyner's signal scrambling scheme [44] based
on discrete prolate spheroidal sequences (DPSS), which are
dened as the normalized eigenvectors of the following real
and symmetric matrix:
V =
·
sin(2¼W (m¡ n))
¼(m¡ n)
¸
0·m;n·N¡1
: (1)
Denote the DPSS, i.e., the N eigenvectors of V, by
fÁjgN¡1j=0 , where Áj =
£
Áj(0) ¢ ¢ ¢ Áj(N ¡ 1)
¤T
, and
the corresponding eigenvalues by f¸jgN¡1j=0 . It was showed
[45] that fÁjgN¡1j=0 form an orthonormal basis that spans
the subspace of sequences with an energy concentration
in a certain band [¡W;W ]. Thus, for any sequence a =£
a(0) ¢ ¢ ¢ a(N ¡ 1)¤T , one can use the DPSS to get an-
other sequence, ® =
£
®0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ®N¡1
¤T
, such that ® = Sa
(or a = ST®), where S =
£
Á0 ¢ ¢ ¢ ÁN¡1
¤T
. Based
on such a DPSS transformation, one can scramble ® and
then perform an inverse transform as an alternative way of
encrypting the original sequence a. The encryption process
can be described as a0 = STM® = STMSa, where M is
the secret matrix that scrambles ®. For such a scrambling
scheme, Wyner [44] showed that the bandwidth expansion
will be negligible if the smallest eigenvalue corresponding
to scrambled coefcients in ® is sufciently large. More
precisely, assuming that all coefcients in ® are ranked by
the eigenvalues in descending order and only the v lowest
coefcients3 f®jgv¡1j=0 are scrambled, Wyner deduced that the
energy concentration of the scrambled sequence a0 differs at
most by 1 ¡ ¸v¡1 as compared to the concentration of the
original sequence a. In this case, the secret matrix M is in
the following form:
M =
·
Mv 0
0 IN¡v
¸
; (2)
where Mv is the sub-matrix scrambling the v lowest coef-
cients and IN¡v is the (N¡v)£(N¡v) identity matrix. One
can see that this scrambling scheme is a selective encryption
algorithm, since some coefcients in ® are left unchanged.
In [43], the 1-D DPSS was extended to the case of 2-D
square passband region as follows:
Á
(2D)
j1;j2
(n1; n2) = Á
(1D)
j1
(n1)Á
(1D)
j2
(n2); (3)
where 0 · n1; j1 · N1 ¡ 1 and 0 · n2; j2 · N2 ¡
1. Accordingly, the eigenvalues corresponding to Á(2D)j1;j2 are
¸
(2D)
j1;j2
= ¸(1D)j1 ¸
(1D)
j2
. Then, by scanning all elements in
each Á(2D)j1;j2 to form an N1N2 £ 1 vector Á
(2D)
j (0 · j ·
N1N2 ¡ 1) and sorting these eigenvectors such that ¸(2D)0 ¸
¢ ¢ ¢ ¸ ¸(2D)N1N2¡1, one gets an N1N2 £ N1N2 matrix S =h
Á
(2D)
0 ¢ ¢ ¢ Á(2D)N1N2¡1
iT
. Now, given an N1N2 £ N1N2
secret matrixM and anN1N2£1 vector a, the 2-D scrambling
scheme has the same encryption formula as the 1-D one:
a0 = STMSa =Ma: (4)
Each N1 £ N2 block of a digital image is scanned row by
row (or column by column) to form an N1N2 £ 1 vector,
which is then encrypted by using the above equation. After
the encryption is done, all elements in the N1N2 £ 1 vector
a0 are placed back into the N1£N2 image block in the same
scanning order.
3Here, the v lowest coefcients mean those coefcients corresponding
to the v largest eigenvalues, i.e., the v low-frequency components of the 2-D
DPSS transform.
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Besides scrambling v lowest coefcients in ®, another
encryption operation was also suggested in [43]: swapping
these coefcients that correspond to the same eigenvalues.
This swapping operation is dependent on the fact that ¸(2D)j1;j2 =
¸
(2D)
j2;j1
and is unavailable in the 1-D case. In [43], it was not
explicitly mentioned how to perform the swapping operation
on valid coefcients. However, if all pairs of coefcients with
the same eigenvalue are swapped, then the adversary can swap
all of them to totally cancel this encryption operation. So, in
this paper, we assume that a secret pseudo-random keystream
is used to randomly select some (averagely half of all) pairs
of coefcients for swapping.
When the scrambling scheme is exerted on digital images
with L gray scales, the input and output have to be calibrated
to make the scrambling more efcient. Assuming that one
plain-block in the plain-image is J and the corresponding
cipher-block is J 0 (both are N1N2£1-vectors), the encryption
process becomes
J 0 = round
µM (J ¡ L=2)
°
+ L=2
¶
; (5)
where round(¢) converts the input real number into the nearest
integer in f0; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; L¡ 1g, L is an N1N2 £ 1 vector in which
each element is L and
° = max
n
0@N1N2¡1X
j=0
jMn;j j
1A : (6)
Accordingly, assuming the recovered image block is J^ , the
decryption process is carried out as follows:
J^ = round
¡MT (° (J 0 ¡ L=2)) + L=2¢ : (7)
Due to the round-off errors existing in the encryp-
tion/decryption processes, it is obvious that the original plain-
image cannot be exactly recovered in most cases. Another
problem is that the use of ° may enlarge the noise added to
J 0. In Sec. V of [43], experimental results were given to show
that ° may not be determined by Eq. (6), and an optimal
value was found for a set of test images: ° = 3, in the sense
of MAE (mean absolute error) and MSE (mean squared error)
in the recovering of the plain-image4.
As to the choice of the secret sub-matrixMv that scrambles
the v lowest coefcients in ®, it was suggested in [43] to derive
it from a Hadamard matrixH, which is a v£v (¡1; 1)-matrix5
and its rows and columns are orthogonal [46]. Its inverse
matrix is H¡1 = 1vH
T . By permuting the rows/columns of
H, and/or multiplying some rows/columns by ¡1, one can get
an H-equivalent matrix. In this way, one can get (v!2v)2 H-
equivalent matrices, where some of them are identical. Each
H-equivalent matrix H¤ can be scaled to get a secret sub-
matrix, Mv = 1pvH
¤.
4In this paper, we mainly use PSNR to investigate the performance, because
PSNR is more popular in the area of image processing than MAE and MSE.
To keep a direct comparison with the results in [43], the MAE value is also
given for all images measured in this paper with PSNR.
5The order of a Hadamard matrix (i.e., the value of v) cannot be an arbitrary
value, but can only be 1, 2, or 4n, where n 2 Z. So this key-generate method
can be used only when v satises this requirement.
Generally, the plain-image is much larger than N1 £ N2,
so there are many N1 £N2 blocks for encryption. To further
enhance the security of the image scrambling scheme, in [43]
it was also suggested that one should change the secret matrix
for each block, under the control of a cryptographical pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG). In this case, the key of
the scrambling scheme becomes the seed of the PRNG. To
facilitate the following cryptanalysis, we use change key=1
to denote this encryption conguration and change key=0 to
denote the basic conguration with a xed secret matrix.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS
As a major part of modern cryptology, cryptanalysis focuses
on the security analysis of different kinds of cryptographi-
cal algorithms, including encryption schemes (ciphers), hash
functions, security protocols, etc. [7]. Generally, the following
four types of attacks should be considered when evaluating
the security of a cipher:
² ciphertext-only attack, in which an attacker can only
observe a number of ciphertexts;
² known-plaintext attack, in which an attacker can observe
a number of plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts;
² chosen-plaintext attack, in which an attacker can delib-
erately choose a number of plaintexts and observe the
corresponding ciphertexts;
² chosen-ciphertext attack, in which an attacker can delib-
erately choose a number of ciphertexts and observe the
corresponding plaintexts.
Among the four attacks, ciphertext-only attack is the simplest
one and every cipher should resist this kind of attack. The
other three attacks are much more advanced, but become
more and more popular in today's digital and networked
world. Known-plaintext attack is very common on modern
ciphers, since most binary les and data packets transmitted
over networks have some xed segments, such as the leading
headers and frequently-used syntax elements. Chosen-plaintext
and chosen-ciphertext attacks are possible when an attacker
gets a temporary access to the encryption/decryption machine,
or can seduce the target user to store some chosen les or
transmit some chosen data. An imaginary scenario of chosen-
plaintext attack is as follows: 1) Eve sends an interesting
photo to Alice; 2) Alice encrypts the photo with her secret
key and then forwards it to Bob for sharing; 3) Eve mounts
a chosen-plaintext attack after observing the encrypted photo
transmitted over the public channel.
If a cipher can resist only ciphertext-only attack, it has to
be used very carefully to avoid any possibility of the other
three types of attacks. In this section, we report a results of
a comprehensive investigation on the security of the image
scrambling scheme under study against all the four kinds of
attacks. Throughout this section, without loss of generality,
we employ the scrambling parameters used in [43, Sec. V]
for demonstration: N1 = N2 = N = 8, W = 0:25, v = 8,
° = 3. The secret matrix and the random swapping operations
are both controlled by the rand() function with a random
seed. All the experiments were carried out with Mathwork's
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 18, NO. 3, PP. 338349, 2008
Matlab 6.5, based on a series of programs derived from the
reference codes6 used in [43].
A. Ciphertext-Only Attack
The visible encryption performance of the image scrambling
scheme is explained rst. For a 256 £ 256 plain-image with
256 gray scales (i.e., L = 256) shown in Fig. 1, the encryption
results when change key=0 and 1 are given in Figs. 2a and 2b,
respectively. It can be seen that some smooth areas in the plain-
image is still recognizable after encryption. This problem was
also noticed by the authors of [43] and considered as a minor
security problem that can be further improved with some other
techniques.
Fig. 1. The plain-image Lenna.
a) b)
Fig. 2. The encryption results of Lenna when a) change key=0 and b)
change key=1.
In the following, consider how to get more visual infor-
mation from the cipher-images than that in Fig. 2. There are
several different ways to do so.
1) Error-Concealment Based Attack [11]: Since the image
scrambling scheme is a selective encryption algorithm, we can
try to recover the plain-image from these unencrypted coef-
cients. This error-concealment based attack (ECA in short)
is a common attack on all selective encryption methods. As
pointed out in [2], [47], for selective encryption based on any
orthogonal transform, there is always some visual information
leaking from the unencrypted transform coefcients. Although
the corresponding energy of these unencrypted coefcients
may be rather small, some important visual information can
6Courtesy of Dr. Dimitri Van De Ville (the rst author of [43]).
still be distinguished by human eyes. It is true that 2-D DPSS
also form an orthogonal transform, so an attacker can try to
carry out an ECA on the image scrambling scheme by setting
the v scrambled low coefcients to be some xed values.
For the cipher-images shown in Fig. 2, the broken results are
shown in Fig. 3 when the xed values are 0 and ®v (the lowest
unencrypted coefcient). Comparing Figs. 2 and 3, one can see
that a rough view of the original plain-image has emerged.
a) PSNR=13.0213 dB
(MAE=44.0384)
b) PSNR=13.1224 dB
(MAE=43.5369)
c) PSNR=14.1972 dB
(MAE=33.6299)
d) PSNR=14.3298 dB
(MAE=33.0244)
Fig. 3. The breaking performance of ECA on the cipher-images shown in
Fig. 2, by setting the v = 8 scrambled low coefcients of each block as
follows: a) ®0 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ®7 = 0, change key=0; b) ®0 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ®7 = 0,
change key=1; c) ®0 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ®7 = ®8, change key=0; d) ®0 = ¢ ¢ ¢ =
®7 = ®8, change key=1.
The broken results shown in Fig. 3 can be further enhanced
by investigating the statistical properties of all the coefcients
in ®. For the plain-image shown in Fig. 1, we calculated
the histograms of all the 2-D DPSS coefcients and those
of ®0 » ®9 are given in Fig. 4. Among the 10 lowest 2-
D DPSS coefcients, one can see that the mean values of
®1, ®2, ®3, ®6, ®7 and ®9 are all close to 0, while those of
®0, ®4, ®5 and ®8 are not (see also Fig. 5 for a plot of all
the N2 = 64 mean values). Dividing all the mean values by
that of ®8, we can get 64 ratios, fri = E(®i)=E(®8)g63i=0, as
shown in Fig. 6. If these ratios keep approximately unchanged
for most natural images, one can use them to statistically
optimize the breaking performance of ECA. For 1,200 natural
images falling into four different categories, people, wild
animals, textures and city life and China, we calculated
the mean values and variances of frig63i=0 as shown in Fig. 7.
One can see that the mean values of these ratios are really
stable for the 1,200 test images (though the variances are
not very small for some ones): r0 ¼ 2:8, r4 ¼ r5 ¼ 1:68,
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r1 ¼ r2 ¼ r3 ¼ r6 ¼ r7 ¼ 0.
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Fig. 4. The histograms of ®0 » ®9 estimated from all blocks in the plain-
image Lenna (order: from left to right, from top to bottom).
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 63
−150
−100
−50
0
Fig. 5. The mean values of the 64 2-D DPSS coefcients of all blocks in
the plain-image Lenna.
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 63
−1
0
1
2
3
Fig. 6. The ratios of the mean values of the 64 2-D DPSS coefcients to
the mean value of ®8 of all blocks in the plain-image Lenna.
The above fact implies that the following setting of the 8
lowest coefcients is optimal to achieve the best breaking
performance of ECA in a statistical sense: ®0 = 2:8®8,
®4 = ®5 = 1:68®8, ®1 = ®2 = ®3 = ®6 = ®7 = 0.
For the two cipher-images shown in Fig. 2, the performance
of such an optimized ECA is shown in Fig. 8. Considering
the variances of ri shown in Fig. 7b, in a real attack one
can further adjust the values of r1, r4 and r5 to get an even
better breaking performance. For example, by introducing a
small degree of randomness in the values of r0 » r7, we have
obtained some results with clearer edges and higher PSNR
values (i.e., smaller MAE values). The corresponding results
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 63
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0
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2
3
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 63
−1
0
1
2
3
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 63
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a) Mean values
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0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 63
0
0.25
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b) Variances
Fig. 7. The mean values and variances of fri = E(®i)=E(®8)g63i=0 of
1,200 test images in four different categories (from top to bottom: people,
wild animals, textures, city life and China).
are shown in Fig. 9. Comparing Fig. 9 with Fig. 8, one can
easily distinguish the improvements around the edges.
a) PSNR=18.6957 dB
(MAE=18.2867)
b) PSNR=19.0843 dB
(MAE=17.4056)
Fig. 8. The optimized ECA of the cipher-images shown in Fig. 2, when
®0 = 2:8®8, ®4 = ®5 = 1:68®8, ®1 = ®2 = ®3 = ®6 = ®7 = 0.
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a) PSNR=19.2498 dB
(MAE=17.0121)
b) PSNR=19.3390 dB
(MAE=16.8824)
Fig. 9. The optimized ECA of the cipher-images shown in Fig. 2, when the
value of each ®i is disturbed by a random variable distributed uniformly in
(¡0:1; 0:1).
To further demonstrate the performance of this attack, the
results of the optimized ECA for other two plain-images,
cameraman and house, are given in Fig. 11.
a) cameraman b) house
c) scrambled cameraman d) scrambled house
Fig. 10. Two plain-images, cameraman and house, and the corresponding
cipher-images when change key=1.
2) Breaking Random Swapping: When change key=0, the
random swapping coefcients may be exhaustively guessed
and then veried by observing the breaking performance of the
optimized ECA. When v = 8, there are 8(8¡ 1)=2¡ 3 = 25
pairs of coefcients with equal eigenvalues in f®ig63i=8, so
the complexity of guessing all random coefcients operations
is not greater than O(225). Since the 2-D DPSS coefcients
f®ig63i=32 play a minor role in representing the visual infor-
mation of an image, one can only guess the random swapping
coefcients in f®ig31i=8, in which there are only 14¡ 3 = 11
valid pairs of coefcients for possible swapping. In this case,
the guessing complexity is reduced to be O(211) and becomes
a) PSNR=18.2250 dB
(MAE=15.8023)
b) PSNR=20.9006 dB
(MAE=12.1457)
Fig. 11. The optimized ECA for the cipher-images corresponding to the two
plain-images shown in Fig. 10, when the value of each ®i is disturbed by a
random variable distributed uniformly in (¡0:1; 0:1).
feasible for an attacker to carry out in practice. Because the
attacker does not know the original image, he/she has to check
each obtained image by naked eyes, trying to nd a satisfactory
result. Assuming that he/she can examine one image within
one minute, a complexity of O(211) means that two days
should be enough to nish the work. In the case that a group
of people are working together, the attack will be even much
easier. Figure 12 shows the broken result when all random
swapping operations of ®8 » ®31 are removed. Comparing
Fig. 12 with Fig. 8a, one can see that the former contains
more recognizable details.
Fig. 12. The breaking performance of the optimized ECA when the
random swapping operations of ®8 » ®31 are removed: PSNR=20.4684 dB
(MAE=14.2199).
To x this security defect, one can either enlarge the block
size or always set change key=1. The latter is better since it
works for any block size.
3) Insecurity of Hadamard-Based Matrices: When the se-
cret sub-matrix Mv is generated from a v £ v Hadamard
matrix H as suggested in [43], our experiments showed that
the decryption is not sufciently sensitive to the key mismatch,
which is an undesirable property for a good cryptosystem and
generally leads to a dramatic reduction of the key space [7]. In
our experiments, we exerted some fundamental matrix trans-
formations on the original sub-matrix Mv so as to get some
mismatched matrices, which are then used as a replacement
of the original secret matrix M for decrypting the cipher-
image Fig. 2a. Some selected results are given in Fig. 13,
from which one can see that many severely mismatched keys
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a) PSNR=7.6723 dB
(MAE=34.8139)
b) PSNR=22.7551 dB
(MAE=12.2794)
c) PSNR=13.2305 dB
(MAE=37.3327)
d) PSNR=15.0715 dB
(MAE=30.8321)
e) PSNR=9.8364 dB
(MAE=58.8623)
f) PSNR=13.4130 dB
(MAE=38.3956)
g) PSNR=11.0181 dB
(MAE=49.2140)
h) PSNR=10.8862 dB
(MAE=52.1581)
Fig. 13. The decryption results (when change key=0) corresponding to the plain-image Lenna with some mismatched keys by processing the sub-matrix
Mv as follows: a) reversing the signs of all elements; b) swapping Rows 1, 8; c) swapping Columns 1, 8; d) swapping Rows 1, 8 and Columns 1, 8; e)
reversing the order of all rows; f) reversing the order of all rows and the signs of all elements; g) reversing the order of all columns; h) reversing the order
of all rows and that of all columns.
can still recover the plain-image with acceptable qualities.
The low sensitivity of decryption to key mismatch means
that a randomly-generated key may be capable of roughly
recovering the plain-image. Figure 14 gives the best recovery
result of one experiment, in which 100 randomly-generated
keys were used to decrypt the cipher-image Fig. 2a. By
testing 100,000 random keys, an estimated probability density
function (pdf) of PSNR were obtained as shown in Fig. 15.
From this empirical pdf, we can calculate and obtain the
probability of PSNR¸14 dB be about 0.017. Thus, it is a
high-probability event to get a similar result like Fig. 14 by
guessing only O(100) random keys, making the random-guess
attack feasible in practice. In some sense, we can say that the
size of the Hadamard-based key space is dramatically reduced
to be smaller than 100.
Note that this security aw is not so severe when
change key=1. In this case, each block is encrypted by a
different secret matrix. If the number of blocks in a plain-
image is sufciently large, it will be impossible to randomly
guess all possible secret matrices to reveal the whole image.
Of course, it remains practical for an attacker to guess several
selected blocks and roughly recover a small window of the
plain-image.
4) Low Sensitivity to Plaintext: The encryption scheme un-
der study has another undesirable property: it is not sufciently
sensitive to plaintext. This feature is a natural result of the
low sensitivity of the involved matrix computation to input
plaintext. Assume that the additive error in a is bounded by
Fig. 14. The best recovery result of the plain-image Lenna decrypted with
100 randomly-generated keys: PSNR=16.0590 dB (MAE=27.9677).
". Then, the augmented error in a0 = Ma is bounded by
N1N2", since each element of jMj is not greater than 1. This
means that the encryption scheme under study is not suitable
to be used for encrypting a number of similar plain-images
(such as an image and its watermarked counterpart) with the
same key; otherwise, the exposure of one plain-image leads
to a rough revealment of all the plain-images.
B. Known-Plaintext Attack
In known-plaintext attack, one can get a number of plain-
images and the corresponding cipher-images. According to Eq.
(5), the encryption matrix M can be derived as follows when
N1N2 known plain-blocks form an invertible N1N2 £N1N2
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Fig. 15. The empirical pdf of PSNR of the decrypted result of the cipher-
image Fig. 2a, estimated from 100,000 random keys.
matrix (J ¡ L=2):
M = °(J 0 +¢J 0 ¡ L=2)(J ¡ L=2)¡1; (8)
where J 0 is the N1N2 £ N1N2 cipher-matrix corresponding
to J , and ¢J 0 denotes the error matrix induced by the
round(¢) function. By ignoring the error matrix ¢J 0 , M can
be estimated by the following equation:fM = °(J 0 ¡ L=2)(J ¡ L=2)¡1; (9)
and the estimation error is
¢M = fM¡M = °¢J 0(J ¡ L=2)¡1: (10)
Then, fMT can be used as a replacement of MT for decryp-
tion.
It is not easy to theoretically analyzes the relationship
between J and ¢M (i.e., the relationship between J and
the decryption performance of fM), so we carried out a
large number of experiments to investigate the real decryption
performance of fMT by choosing some sets of N1N2 plain-
blocks to form J . In the following, we report our experimental
results for two different cases according to the two values of
change key.
1) change key=0: In this case, all blocks of a plain-image
are encrypted with the same matrix M, so generally one
known plain-image is enough for an attacker to choose many
sets of N1N2 plain-blocks, some of which may correspond
to a good estimation of M (i.e., to an acceptable recovery
performance of any given plain-image).
When the known plain-image is Lenna (Fig. 1), the best
results of decrypting the cipher-image of Lenna (Fig. 2a)
in two separate attacks are given in Fig. 16, with 1,000 and
10,000 sets of N1N2 blocks7, respectively. One can see that
the decryption performance is good enough to reveal almost
all visual information in the plain-image.
7To ensure the invertibility of the formed matrix J ¡L=2 and to increase
the attacking efciency, in our experiments we rst ranked all valid blocks by
their variances and then randomly chose N1N2 blocks from the 100 ones with
larger variances for attacking. A similar but slightly different measure was also
used for the experiments given in next sub-subsection when change key=1.
a) PSNR=19.2223 dB
(MAE=19.7005)
b) PSNR=20.4598 dB
(MAE=16.5549)
Fig. 16. The best decryption results in two experiments of known-plaintext
attack with the known plain-image Lenna (when change key=0): a) 1,000
sets of N1N2 = 64 plain-blocks; b) 10,000 sets of N1N2 = 64 plain-blocks.
Further experiments showed that some known plain-images
can even yield a much better performance than Lenna. When
the known plain-image Lenna is replaced by the two images
shown in Fig. 17, respectively, the decryption results of the
cipher-image Fig. 2a are given in Fig. 18. It can be seen that
the decryption performance is nearly perfect. Although it is
hard to give a theoretical explanation, this phenomenon can
be intuitively explained: Lenna contains less blocks with
large variances than the other two images.
a) b)
Fig. 17. Other two images for testing the performance of known-plaintext
attack when change key=0.
a) PSNR=27.7240 dB
(MAE=7.4056)
b) PSNR=29.8383 dB
(MAE=5.6989)
Fig. 18. The decryption results of known-plaintext attack when when
Figs. 17a and 17b serve as the known plain-image, respectively, where
change key=0 and 1,000 sets of N1N2 = 64 plain-blocks are processed.
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2) change key=1: In this case, each block of a plain-image
corresponds to a distinctive encryption matrix Mi;j , so one
plain-image is not capable of supporting the known-plaintext
attack. Instead, m ¸ N1N2 plain-images should be known
such that for each block, N1N2 plain-blocks (one in each
plain-image) can be chosen to estimate eachMi;j . Whenm =
200, for the four different categories of natural images used in
the last subsection, wild animals, people, textures, and
city life and China, we tested the decryption performances of
the known-plaintext attack with 500 valid sets of N1N2 plain-
blocks for each Mi;j (note that there are
¡
m
N1N2
¢
possible
sets, but some may not be valid). The decryption results are
shown in Fig. 19. The different performances of different sets
can be qualitatively explained as follows: for a given block-
position (i; j), the breaking performance will be better, if
the corresponding blocks of all known plain-images are less
correlated. For example, for the category people, most plain-
images have a relatively smooth background, so blocks from
different plain-images may be closely correlated or even be
almost identical. This will signicantly reduce the breaking
performance. On the other hand, for the category textures,
generally there does not exist a smooth background, so blocks
from different plain-images are relatively less correlated.
By choosing more valid sets of N1N2 plain-blocks for each
encryption matrix Mi;j or employing some noise-ltering
methods, the performance can be further improved.
a) PSNR=19.1081 dB
(MAE=17.4211)
b) PSNR=13.5778 dB
(MAE=32.9514)
c) PSNR=28.6367 dB
(MAE=6.3547)
d) PSNR=27.3269 dB
(MAE=7.2946)
Fig. 19. The decryption results of known-plaintext attack when
change key=1, with m = 200 known plain-images lying in one of the
following four different categories of natural images: a) wild animals, b)
people, c) textures, d) city life and China. For each value of (i; j), 500
valid sets of N1N2 = 64 plain-blocks are chosen to estimate each Mi;j .
C. Chosen-Plaintext Attack
Compared with known-plaintext attack, in chosen-plaintext
attack one can freely choose some plain-blocks to optimize
the breaking performance. Now let us choose J ¡ L=2 = sI,
where I denotes the N1N2£N1N2 identity matrix. Then, Eq.
(10) can be simplied as follows:
¢M = °¢J 0(sI)¡1 =
°¢J 0
s
: (11)
On the range of each element in ¢J 0 , we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: When ° ¸ 1, j¢J 0(i; j)j · 1, 8(i; j).
Proof: Observing Eq. (8), one can deduce that
J 0 +¢J 0 ¡ L=2 = M(J ¡ L=2)
°
=
sM
°
:
SinceM is an orthogonal matrix, we have ¡1 ·M(i; j) · 1,
so that
¡jsj
°
+ L=2 · J 0(i; j) + ¢J 0(i; j) · jsj
°
+ L=2:
Considering jsj · L=2 and ° ¸ 1, we have
J 0(i; j) + ¢J 0(i; j) 2 [0; L];
which immediately leads to j¢J 0(i; j)j · 1 and proves the
proposition8.
Then, from Proposition 1, one can get
j¢M(i; j)j =
¯¯¯¯
°¢J 0(i; j)
s
¯¯¯¯
· °jsj ; (12)
which means that the best breaking performance is reached
when jsj is maximized, i.e., s = ¡L=2 when J = (1¡I)L=2.
With this chosen value of s, some experiments have been made
to conrm this theoretical result, as shown in Fig. 20. Note that
this attack needs only N1N2 plain-blocks when change key=0
and N1N2 plain-images when change key=1.
a) PSNR=37.7884 dB
(MAE=2.3627)
b) PSNR=37.5721 dB
(MAE=2.4110)
Fig. 20. The decryption results of chosen-plaintext attack when s = ¡L=2 =
¡128 for the following two cases: a) change key=0; b) change key=1.
8When ° ¸ L=2
L=2¡1 = 1+2=(L¡2), this proposition has a stronger result:
j¢J 0 (i; j)j · 1=2, since J0(i; j) + ¢J 0 (i; j) 2 [0; L ¡ 1]. But the weak
result is already sufcient to support the following analysis on the choice of
jsj.
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D. Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
In this attack, one can choose cipher-images instead of
plain-images, so the target for reconstruction changes from
M to its transpose matrix MT . When N1N2 cipher-blocks
form an invertible N1N2 £N1N2 matrix J 0 ¡ L=2, one can
get the following equation from Eq. (7):
MT = (J^ ¡ L=2 + ¢J^ )(J
0 ¡ L=2)¡1
°
: (13)
Removing the quantization error ¢J^ , one has
gMT = (J^ ¡ L=2)(J 0 ¡ L=2)¡1
°
; (14)
and
¢MT = gMT ¡MT = ¢J^ (J 0 ¡ L=2)¡1° : (15)
Similarly, choosing J 0 ¡ L=2 = sI, one further gets
¢MT =
¢J^ (sI)
¡1
°
=
¢J^
s°
: (16)
On the range of each element in ¢J^ , we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2: j¢J^ (i; j)j · 1=2, 8(i; j) if and only if
¡ L+ 1
2°MT (i; j) · s ·
L¡ 1
2°MT (i; j) : (17)
Proof: From Eq. (7), one has
J^ +¢J^ =MT (°(J 0 ¡ L=2)) + L=2 = s°MT + L=2:
Note that j¢J^ (i; j)j · 1=2 if and only if ¡1=2 · J^(i; j) +
¢J^ (i; j) · (L ¡ 1) + 1=2, which is equivalent to ¡1=2 ·
s°MT (i; j) + L=2 · L ¡ 1=2. Solving the two inequalities
proves the proposition.
From the above proposition, when ¡ L+1
2°max(MT ) · s ·
L¡1
2°max(MT ) , one has
j¢MT (i; j)j =
¯¯¯¯
¢J^ (i; j)
s°
¯¯¯¯
· 1
2jsj° : (18)
When s > L¡1
2°max(MT ) or s < ¡ L+12°max(MT ) , it is not easy to
directly estimate the range of j¢MT (i; j)j, but it is expected to
be greater than 12jsj° . For a randomly generated key, Fig. 21
gives the experimental relationship between the value of s
and the breaking performance of the chosen-ciphertext attack,
from which one can see that the best decryption performance is
achieved when jsj ¼ 47 (see Fig. 22 for the decryption results
when s = ¡47). Due to the symmetry of the curve shown in
Fig. 21, in a real attack one can try all positive (or negative)
values of s to determine an optimal value as the outcome of the
cryptanalysis. This means that the attack needs no more than
N1N2L=2 cipher-blocks when change key=0 and N1N2L=2
cipher-images when change key=1. Note that in most cases
it is actually sufcient to achieve a nearly optimal result by
xing the value of jsj around 50. In this case, N1N2 cipher-
blocks/images are enough to support this attack.
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Fig. 21. The experimental relationship between the value of s and the
breaking performance of chosen-ciphertext attack (measured by PSNR), when
the test plain-image is Lenna.
a) PSNR=45.5619 dB
(MAE=0.9937)
b) PSNR=45.2878 dB
(MAE=1.0094)
Fig. 22. The decryption results of chosen-ciphertext attack when s = ¡47
and the test plain-image is Lenna: a) change key=0; b) change key=1.
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IV. DISCUSSION
Recalling the cryptanalysis given in the last section, one can
see that one essential reason for all the attacks to be successful
is the low sensitivity of the decryption to key mismatch.
Actually, this feature is not unique for the original 2-D DPSS
basis set shown in Fig. 1 of [43]. We also tested some
other basis sets and similar results have been obtained (but
with some differences in the details, such as the histograms
of ®0 » ®9 shown in Fig. 4). This implies that the low
sensitivity to key mismatch is a common feature of most (if
not all) orthogonal transforms9. It can be explained by the low
sensitivity of matrix computation to small quantization errors
and the marvelous capability of human eyes to resist noises
in natural images.
In Tables I and II, we give a summary of all the cryptanalytic
results obtained through the last section. It is clear that the
image scrambling scheme under study is not secure against all
the four types of attacks, although it does not suffer from two
security aws, i.e., random swapping breaking and insecurity
of Hadamard-based key, when change key=1.
TABLE I
THE COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF CIPHERTEXT-ONLY ATTACKS
REPORTED IN THIS PAPER, WHERE Nb DENOTES THE NUMBER OF
N1 £N2 BLOCKS IN THE PLAIN-IMAGE.
change key=0 change key=1
error-concealment based attack O(1)
random swapping breaking O(211) O(211Nb )
insecurity of Hadamard-based key O(0:03¡1) O(0:03¡Nb )
TABLE II
THE NUMBERS OF PLAINTEXTS/CIPHERTEXTS NEEDED IN
KNOWN/CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT AND CHOSEN-CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS.
change key=0 change key=1
(blocks) (images)
known-plaintext attack O(N1N2)
chosen-plaintext attack N1N2
chosen-ciphertext attack · N1N2L=2
From the experimental results given in the last section,
the breaking performance of the four attacks can be ranked
as follows (from the best to the worst): chosen-ciphertext
attack > chosen-plaintext attack > known-plaintext attack >
ciphertext-only attack (ECA). For the worst attack, the error-
concealment based attack, only a low-resolution view of the
plain-image can be successfully recovered, and most high-
resolution details are lost (see Fig. 8). As a result, we have
the following recommendations on how to apply this particular
image scrambling scheme in real applications:
² Use it ONLY for the purpose of perceptual encryption.
² NEVER use the same key to encrypt more than one plain-
image10. Or, NEVER repeatedly use the same key for
more than one plain-image if known/chosen-plaintext or
chosen-ciphertext attack is likely.
9As an interesting comparison, there is another similar (but with different
reason) phenomenon [2], [47]: selective encryption working with any orthog-
onal transform cannot conceal all visual information of the plain-image.
10To do so, a key-management system is generally needed to generate a
secret key for each plain-image [7].
² ALWAYS set change key=1 if the secret matrix is gen-
erated from a Hadamard matrix.
Perceptual encryption is a technique of multimedia encryp-
tion that is used to degrade the perceptible quality of multi-
media data, under the control of a secret key and a quality-
degradation factor [2], [10]. Here, the secret key is used to
avoid any illegal attempt of reconstructing the multimedia
data in a higher quality, and the quality-degradation factor
determines the degradation degree induced by the perceptual
encryption. Apparently, for the image scrambling scheme
under study, the degradation on the visual quality of the plain-
image should not be measured by the cipher-image, but by
the recovered plain-image via the optimized ECA discussed
in Sec. III-A.1.
Despite the above security problems and limitations, this
particular image scrambling scheme has some advantages
in realizing a lossy perceptual encryption scheme, i.e., an
encryption scheme that works well with any lossy compression
algorithm. This is mainly because this scrambling scheme does
not incur signicant bandwidth expansion, which is generally
not the case for many other image encryption schemes. Our
experiments have shown that the encryption has only negli-
gible inuence on the compression efciency of a standard
JPEG algorithm, as expected from the bandwidth preservation
feature. Another important factor is that the decryption is not
very sensitive to errors in cipher-images, due to the same
reason that the encryption is not very sensitive to plaintext
as discussed in Sec. III-A.4. Figure 23 gives the decryption
results when the cipher-image Fig. 2b is compressed by
the standard JPEG algorithm with the parameter Quality
equal to 40 » 90, respectively. One can see that the lossy
compression really leads to a lossy decryption result, but
the recovery performance remains acceptable as long as the
compression ratio is not very high.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a comprehensive investigation on the
security of an image scrambling scheme recently proposed in
[43]. As a result, it has been found that this image scrambling
scheme is not sufciently secure against various types of at-
tacks: ciphertext-only attack, known-plaintext attack, chosen-
plaintext attack, chosen-ciphertext attack. Other two major
security aws have also been pointed out when a xed secret
matrix is used to encrypt the whole image. Based on the
cryptanalytic results, it is concluded that this image scrambling
scheme can only be used for (lossless or lossy) perceptual
encryption, instead of providing a full protection of all (or
most) visual information in the plain-image.
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